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Standing Up for Mr. Nesbitt
By STEPHEN WM. SMITH*
MR. NESBITT OF HARLOW NEW TOWN near London has a prob-
lem—he does not wish to be seen. He refuses to stand up even when
requested to do so by local authorities. However, he has chosen a very
obvious piece of cover, hiding behind a lone bush in the middle of a
clearing near a wood. The bush soon explodes and a scream is heard.
The video telling his sad story and others like it is available online.1
Although Mr. Nesbitt is a fictional character in a Monty Python
sketch, I cited this video in a footnote of a recent opinion2 for several
reasons. Partly it was to see how many people actually read footnotes
in legal opinions. But the footnote also illustrates a sobering point: If
the government wants to find you, it will find you. Even with very gen-
eralized cell phone tower data, the government can easily combine
that with other available information—your Facebook page, em-
ployer’s location, girlfriend’s address, a credit card purchase—to fig-
ure out exactly where you are at any given time.3 This is true even if,
like the unfortunate Mr. Nesbitt, you don’t want to be seen and refuse
to stand up when asked.
* United States Magistrate Judge, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
This paper is an extended version of remarks presented by the author at the University of
San Francisco Law Review Symposium entitled “Big Brother in the 21st Century” on
February 24, 2012.
1. Monty Python’s Flying Circus: How Not to be Seen (BBC television broadcast Dec. 8,
1970), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zekiZYSVdeQ.
2. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837
n.69 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
3. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT (2008), available at http://
iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22285/Protecting_Individual_Privacy.pdf; Press Release, ACLU,
FBI Data Mining and Collection Programs Threaten Privacy of Innocent Americans (Sept.
24, 2009), available at www.aclu.org/national-security-technology-and-liberty/fbi-data-min-
ing-and-collection-programs-threaten-privacy-in.
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This raises a question worth exploring. If Mr. Nesbitt cannot af-
ford to stand up for himself, who does stand up for him and all the
other Nesbitts in the world? That is, who stands between ordinary citi-
zens like us and an increasingly surveillance-happy state?
I am the first to admit that some Nesbitts are dangerous and
probably deserve to be watched. If Mr. Nesbitt heads up a drug cartel,
runs a mortgage fraud scam, or commits a series of axe-murders, he
should surely be found and brought to justice. But what about all the
other Nesbitts who are law abiding: the soccer moms, the Sunday
school teachers, the law school professors, the newspaper reporters?
You may say that’s not a big concern because the government
would not bother to target them unless they were committing a crime.
But you would probably be wrong, at least if the government’s re-
sponse to a 2008 Freedom of Information Act suit is accurate. Asked
to furnish docket information about all criminal cases brought against
individuals who had been subject to warrantless cell phone tracking
since 2001, the Department of Justice identified a total of just 255
criminal prosecutions.4 This works out to about thirty-eight cases a
year. Given that the federal government obtains tens of thousands of
these orders every year,5 this data suggests that the government
spends more time chasing the innocent Nesbitts than the black sheep
and ne’er-do-wells.6
And so I return to my question: Who stands up for the good Mr.
Nesbitt? Consider the possible options. There is the executive branch
itself—which is chiefly responsible for law enforcement—whose vital
functions are carried out by many dedicated and hard-working profes-
sionals. Can’t we just trust them to do the right thing? After all, they
each take an oath to support and defend the U.S. Constitution. Yet
that very same document contains a litany of limits on law enforce-
ment, particularly in the Bill of Rights. If “Trust us, we’re U.S. mar-
shals” had been good enough for the founders, the Fourth
Amendment would never have seen print.
4. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
5. See Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 322 (2012). While it is true that many courts now require a
probable cause warrant as a prerequisite to such tracking, the first opinion doing so was
not issued until 2005. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of
a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber &/or Cell
Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
6. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2012, at A1 (noting that eight cell phone companies reported that they responded to 1.3
million requests for subscriber information in 2011 from law enforcement agencies seek-
ing text messages, caller locations, and other information in the course of investigations).
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How about the legislative branch, the one most directly accounta-
ble to the electorate? Justice Alito, concurring in United States v. Jones,7
suggested that the “best solution to privacy concerns may be legisla-
tive.”8 Alito’s concurrence reflects an ongoing academic debate, in
which the question is often re-framed as follows: Which branch of gov-
ernment, legislative or judicial, is best suited to rein in executive sur-
veillance powers?9
Undoubtedly each branch brings certain institutional advantages
(and disadvantages) to bear on the problem, but neither can legiti-
mately claim outright superiority. As one scholar writes of the Su-
preme Court, it seems “scary to have major issues of policy
determined by nine relatively uninformed people assisted by thirty-
odd twenty-somethings surfing the Web.”10 At the same time, he
writes, Congress is not much better:
Legislation is as often based on anecdote as analysis, interest group
influence in legislative determinations is rampant, staff influence is
considerable, and legislative hearings are typically performances
rather than attempts by the legislature or one of its committees to
obtain information. Although romantic glorification of the judicial
process may be the characteristic pathology of many lawyers and
most American law professors, correcting for this by unwarranted
glorification of the legislative process is no more justified.11
Moreover, this debate has an artificial, even metaphysical whiff
about it. It’s really a false choice—almost like asking which oar of a
rowboat is the best, or which part of an airplane is your favorite: the
left wing or the right. After all, the legislative and judicial branches do
co-exist and operate side by side every day in every state in our nation.
More than that, both branches need each other and cannot effectively
do their jobs without the other. It is idle to pretend that either branch
should twiddle their thumbs on the sidelines while the other plays the
game. Like rowboats and airplanes, the rule of law maintains a true
course only when opposing sides of government play their necessary
7. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
8. Id. at 964. “Let this cup pass” is a familiar refrain by the Court when confronting
new surveillance technology. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to grapple
with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them with prematurely devised constitu-
tional restraints.”); United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 179 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n these areas, the Court’s rush to achieve a logical result must await con-
gressional deliberation.”).
9. Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 295 (2011).
10. Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 267, 289 (2001).
11. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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roles: one co-equal branch counter-balances another; no branch is dis-
pensable. So the proper answer to the question—which branch of gov-
ernment, legislative or judicial, should oversee executive surveillance
power—is both of them.
This is not to say that either branch has always lived up to its
responsibilities. Take the legislative branch, the one most directly ac-
countable to the people. As Justice Alito says, Congress “is well situ-
ated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to
balance privacy and public safety”12 however it sees fit. But how often
does it see fit? The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(“ECPA”),13 the law governing most electronic surveillance, was
passed in 1986, long before the advent of smart phones, Google, or
even the World Wide Web.14 The basic architecture remains in
place,15 but the edifice is showing its age, and the need for major ren-
ovation has been obvious for some time.16 One of the biggest holes in
the ECPA roof is geolocation monitoring.17 Like an absentee land-
lord, Congress has all but ignored this widening breach since the
problem first came to its attention in 1994.18 Occasional bills have
been introduced to patch this hole, but none have passed and several
now languish in committee.19 In the meantime, magistrate judges,
with no congressional guidance about the governing legal standard,
have issued hundreds of thousands of orders giving law enforcement
12. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
13. Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C.).
14. See Modernizing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ACLU, http://
www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/modernizing-electronic-communications-privacy-act-
ecpa (last visited October 30, 2012); Smith, supra note 5, at 313.
15. ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 92 (2010) (statement of Hon. Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J., S.D.
Tex.).
16. See Harley Geiger, Sen. Akaka Introduces Privacy Act Update, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH. (Oct. 28, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/2810sen-akaka-in-
troduces-privacy-act-update.
17. See Ulka Ghanta, Competing Interests: Enforcing Cybersecurity and Protecting Privacy,
LAW PRAC. TODAY (March 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_
today_home/law_practice_today_archive/march12/competing-interests-enforcing-cyber-
security-and-protecting-privacy.html.
18. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
§ 103(a)(2)(B), 108 Stat. 4279, 4281 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)) (forbid-
ding the use of pen registers to obtain phone location data).
19. See, e.g., ECPA Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th Cong. (2011); Geoloca-
tional Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011); Geolocational Privacy and
Surveillance Act, H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011).
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access to cell phone location data.20 This gap in surveillance law has
now persisted for eighteen years.
Consider next the judicial branch, and more specifically the Su-
preme Court, which after all is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional
rights in our system. Has it done much better? The Supreme Court
has decided a total of two ECPA cases21 in the quarter century since
that statute was passed, and in the most recent case decided in 2010,
City of Ontario v. Quon,22 the Supreme Court expressed the worry that
maybe they were moving too fast. “The judiciary risks error by elabo-
rating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become clear.”23 And what
was the emerging technology they were so hesitant to consider in
Quon? Pagers. Alphanumeric pagers. The pager’s role in society is
pretty clear now—nobody has one.24
To be fair, by the time the Court was writing its opinion in Quon,
the underlying factual record was already eight years old—practically
an eternity in the digital era. Even had the Court fully embraced the
opportunity to comprehensively expound Fourth Amendment princi-
ples as applied to electronic communications in government work-
places, the record facts may have been useful only as a historical
jumping-off point.
Another disadvantage faced by the Quon Court is the relative pau-
city of cases involving electronic surveillance under ECPA. The selec-
tion pool for the Supreme Court docket generally comes from the
courts of appeal, where ECPA cases are in short supply. Take our topic
for today—cell phone location tracking. So far, only one federal ap-
pellate court has ever addressed the question of the proper legal stan-
dard for government access to cell phone tracking records from a
phone company, and that decision raised as many questions as it
answered.25
20. See Smith, supra note 5, at 322.
21. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001).
22. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
23. Id. at 2629.
24. This is not quite literally true, although total U.S. revenues for the paging industry
did drop by approximately one-third from 2004 to 2008. Bob Cook, Twilight of the beeper:
Today’s technology offers other ways of keeping connected, Am. Med. News (June 9, 2008), http://
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2008/06/09/bisa0609.htm.
25. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); Susan
Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, Not Fact, 70
MD. L. REV. 681 (2011).
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Ordinarily, one might expect that the relative frequency of cases
at the appellate level is indicative of their frequency at the district
court level, hence the relative need for appellate guidance. But that is
plainly not true of ECPA-related cases; every year the government files
tens of thousands of applications for electronic surveillance orders
under that statutory regime.26 For reasons I have explained else-
where,27 almost none of these decisions are appealed. So despite a
pressing need for appellate court guidance to magistrate judges del-
uged with these requests on a daily basis, almost none has been given.
Let’s put this in perspective. Every year 15,000 employment dis-
crimination cases are filed in federal court,28 and based on innumera-
ble Supreme Court and circuit precedents, every trial court knows
what the plaintiff’s burden of proof is. Inconceivable that it could be
otherwise, most would agree. Yet, every year more than twice that
number of electronic surveillance cases are filed and decided,29 with
literally no binding precedent30 to specify the government’s burden of
proof when tracking your cell phone location. How is that
conceivable?
Almost by default, then, these matters have been left to the lowest
limb of the judicial branch: the magistrate judge. Unlike the Supreme
Court, magistrate judges don’t have the luxury of picking and choos-
ing cases, of waiting until various appellate courts have weighed in
with their considered judgment on difficult or novel issues of law.
Magistrate judges are on the front lines, grappling hand to hand with
the various, novel, and creative surveillance technologies deployed by
law enforcement.31 As a result, there is no danger of their decisions
becoming technologically obsolete the moment they are issued.
That said, the ex parte nature of ECPA applications does present
a major procedural challenge for magistrate judges. These are not ad-
versary proceedings with opposing counsel present to argue the con-
stitutional, statutory, or procedural rights of Mr. Nesbitt or the other
targeted parties. To the contrary, the entire process is sealed away
from public view, cordoned off by gag orders forbidding the elec-
26. Smith, supra note 5, at 321.
27. Id. at 328.
28. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Annual Report of the Director: JUDI-
CIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 168 tbl.C–2 (2007), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/front/completejudicialbusiness.pdf.
29. See Smith, supra note 5, at 322.
30. See id. at 326–31.
31. See, e.g., In re U.S. ex rel. Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), C.R. No.
C–12–670M, 2012 WL 4717778 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012).
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tronic service provider from telling customers that their cell phone or
email records have been turned over to the government.32 Under
these circumstances, it necessarily falls to the magistrate judge to en-
sure that the target’s legal rights are respected. Her role is not that of
an umpire calling balls and strikes, but more like a referee in a one-
sided soccer match forced to play goalie for the missing side.
Ex parte proceedings obviously preclude the sort of adjudicative
fact-finding that is the hallmark of an adversarial hearing in our judi-
cial system. Even so, there are other extra-record sources of informa-
tion available to the court. Data from these sources are commonly
referred to as “legislative facts,” as opposed to the facts to be adjudi-
cated in a particular case.33 Although the terms “legislative” and “adju-
dicative” facts were coined by Professor Kenneth Davis in a landmark
1942 article,34 they describe a distinction rooted in the common law.35
Adjudicative facts typically concern what happened between the par-
ties. They usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when,
how, why, and with what motive or intent and are resolved under the
rules of evidence.36 On the other hand, “legislative facts” are not the
facts of the particular case but more generalized facts about the
world.37 As one scholar has recently explained:
A legislative fact gets its name not necessarily because it is found by
a legislature, but because it relates to the “legislative function” or
policy-making function of a court. The central feature of a legisla-
tive fact is that it “transcend[s] the particular dispute,” and pro-
vides descriptive information about the world which judges use as
foundational “building blocks” to form and apply legal rules.38
This distinction is neither novel nor controversial; it was incorpo-
rated into the Federal Rules of Evidence more than thirty years ago.39
Legislative facts come to the court’s attention by various means: testi-
mony or documentary evidence offered by parties at the trial level;
32. See Smith, supra note 5, at 322–26.
33. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255,
1258–59 (2012).
34. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942).
35. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 940, 948–49 (5th ed.
2010).
36. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03, at 353 (1st ed.
1958).
37. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1255.
38. Id. at 1256–57 (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
39. FED. R. EVID. 201.
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briefing by parties and amici on appeal; or, when the efforts of the
parties are deemed insufficient, in-house research by the court itself.40
Legislative facts are especially common in deciding constitutional
questions, including the application of the Fourth Amendment to
evolving surveillance technology.41 For example, in Berger v. New
York,42 the Court declared unconstitutional a New York statute author-
izing electronic eavesdropping without a probable cause warrant.43
The Court’s opinion roamed freely beyond the factual record,44 which
was summarized in a couple of short paragraphs at the beginning of
the opinion and hardly ever mentioned again. The Court traced the
history of eavesdropping from the days of Blackstone, to its 19th cen-
tury transformation into “wiretapping” by the invention of the tele-
graph and telephone, and finally to its modern incarnation as
sophisticated electronic devices: miniature bugs, fountain pen and
cufflink microphones, electronic rays beamed at walls, mirror trans-
mitters, off-premise parabolic microphones, etc.45 The cited source
for this “eavesdropping catalogue of horrors,”46 as the dissent mock-
ingly called it, was a law review article published after the trial.47 Other
extra-record citations included testimony at a Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee hearing, a report by the President’s Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, and a reference to a poll of
New York prosecutors published eight years previously in a book titled
“The Eavesdroppers.”48 That poll was especially significant because its
numbers were used to refute the government’s claim that outlawing
electronic eavesdropping would severely cripple crime detection.49
Another Supreme Court case resting heavily on legislative facts is
Smith v. Maryland,50 where the Court ruled that installation and use of
a pen register is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment.51
Again, the Court reached out to extra-record sources to explain the
40. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1257–58.
41. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL FACTS 44 (2008).
42. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
43. Id. at 44.
44. Id. at 44–45 (petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to bribe a public official to
obtain a liquor license).
45. Id. at 45–47.
46. Id. at 82 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 47 (citing Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for
the 1970’s, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1005–10 (1966)).
48. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60–62 (1967)
49. Id. at 61.
50. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
51. Id. at 742.
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technology and function of this surveillance device—in particular, two
law review articles explaining that pen registers were regularly em-
ployed by telephone companies to detect fraud, monitor equipment,
prepare customer bills, and identify obscene or annoying phone call-
ers.52 More striking, perhaps, was the Court’s reliance on consumer
information said to appear in “[m]ost phone books” to establish that
telephone users had no subjective expectation of privacy in the num-
bers they dial.53 This prompted a classic sarcastic jibe from the dis-
sent.54 The Court’s affinity for legislative facts was also seen in its
refusal to hinge a constitutional ruling on how the particular phone
company handling the pen register chose to bill its customers for local
calls: “We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amend-
ment, especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of pro-
tection would be dictated by billing practices of a private
corporation.”55
A more recent illustration is Kyllo v. United States,56 involving the
constitutionality of using thermal-imaging devices to detect relative
amounts of heat within the home.57 The decision turned on the tech-
nical capabilities of thermal imagers in general, after pointedly casting
aside the findings of an evidentiary hearing on the intrusiveness of the
Agema Thermovision 210 model used on Kyllo’s house.58 “While the
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we
adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are al-
ready in use or in development.”59 Also relied upon was a Department
of Justice website (as last visited a month prior to its opinion) that
touted the ability to “see” through walls and other opaque barriers as
a scientifically feasible goal of law enforcement research and develop-
ment.60 The Court dismissed the significance of the actual videotape
52. Id. at 741–42 (citing Victor S. Elgort, Note, The Legal Constraints upon the Use of the
Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028 (1975); William A.
Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108 (1970)).
53. Id. at 742–43.
54. “Lacking the Court’s apparently exhaustive knowledge of this Nation’s telephone
books and the reading habits of telephone subscribers . . . I decline to assume general
public awareness of how obscene phone calls are traced.” Id. at 749 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 745.
56. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
57. Id. at 29.
58. Id. at 30–31.
59. Id. at 36.
60. Id. at 36 n.3 (citing NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT & CORRECTIONS TECH. CENTER, http://
www.nlectc.org/techproj/ (last visited May 3, 2001)). While the originally cited webpage is
no longer available, for recent NLECTC updates on surveillance technology see Sensors &
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of the thermal imaging of the defendant’s residence, which had re-
vealed only amorphous images in shades of gray, declaring that the
Court must take the “long view” and give “clear specification of those
methods of surveillance that require a warrant.”61
I do not wish to be misunderstood. These cases do not stand for
the proposition that adjudicative facts are irrelevant or never impor-
tant in constitutional litigation. But they do confirm that legislative
facts generated outside the adversarial process can be important, and
sometimes determinative, in applying the Fourth Amendment to sur-
veillance technology. This means that magistrate judges need not be
deterred from ruling on the constitutionality of electronic surveil-
lance requests simply because the process is ex parte, with little or no
opportunity for an adversary hearing. A magistrate judge forced to
decide such questions as a matter of first impression need not hesitate
to use the same tools, extra-record or not, that appellate courts regu-
larly employ for the same task. The digital revolution has made that
tool more powerful than ever, with massive amounts of information
“just a Google search away.”62
One commentator has argued that magistrate judges are never
permitted, much less forced, to decide constitutional questions unless
a statute expressly confers such authority.63 This seems a very odd pro-
position given that magistrate judges (and U.S. commissioners before
them) have long been entrusted with responsibility for issuing arrest
and search warrants,64 which are nothing other than the flesh and
bone of the Fourth Amendment. It is also very odd to imagine Con-
gress appending Marbury v. Madison65 clauses to its legislation, as if to
thoughtfully remind the third branch of its powers of judicial review.
Surveillance Technologies, JUSTNET, https://www.justnet.org/sensors/index.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2012).
61. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
62. Larsen, supra note 32, at 1260. The author rightfully points out the potential dan-
gers of this brave new world, such as unreliable or mistaken sources, systematic bias, and
notice/legitimacy concerns. Obviously, care should be taken to assure that extra record
sources are both credible and reliable.
63. Orin Kerr, Can Magistrate Judges Rule on How the Fourth Amendment Applies to the
Execution of a Court Order At the Time of the Application?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 28,
2012, 2:33 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/02/28/can-magistrate-judges-rule-on-how-
the-fourth-amendment-applies-to-the-execution-of-a-court-order-at-the-time-of-the-applica-
tion/.
64. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (explaining that protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment requires a neutral and detached magistrate to issue search
warrants).
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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The same commentator has also contended that Fourth Amend-
ment issues are not even ripe for consideration by a magistrate judge
presented with a government application for electronic surveillance.66
According to this view, Fourth Amendment issues ought not even be
considered until after the search has been carried out, charges filed,
and a hearing or trial conducted in the normal adversarial setting,
with counsel for both sides free to present their best arguments and
evidence.67 That way the factual record is fixed, with no need for spec-
ulation, and the law can be applied retrospectively, firmly grounded in
historical facts.68
This argument seems profoundly misguided. In the first place,
warrant decisions are inherently prospective. Like horse race bets and
hurricane predictions, they cannot be made after the anticipated
event occurs. What would be the point? They must be made on lim-
ited and imperfect information available beforehand, or they won’t be
made at all. When is a surveillance order ever ripe for determination
under the Constitution if not at the time the application is made?
Secondly, the legal issues presented before and after the search
are often very different. When a trial court considers whether to sup-
press evidence or overturn a conviction based on challenged evi-
dence, its decision usually does not turn solely on whether the
magistrate judge correctly applied the Fourth Amendment to the gov-
ernment’s application.69 Instead, the court asks whether this particu-
lar defendant has standing to challenge the search or seizure;70
whether the evidence was the fruit of a poisonous tree;71 whether the
defendant timely objected to the evidence or waived objection by
opening the door;72 whether the tainted evidence was admissible for
66. Kerr, supra note 62.
67. See Orin Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241,
1293 (2010). For a response to Kerr’s doctrinal arguments, see Paul Ohm, Massive Hard
Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2011),
available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2011/03/20/ohm.
68. Some have criticized this model of case-specific adjudication as reflecting a con-
ventional prejudice not supported by current social science research. See Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 895 (2006) (“when deci-
sionmakers are in the thrall of a highly salient event, that event will so dominate their
thinking that they will make aggregate decisions that are overdependent on the particular
event and that overestimate the representativeness of that event within some larger array of
events”).
69. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 378–464 (5th ed. 1996).
70. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
71. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
72. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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other purposes such as impeachment;73 or whether its admission was
harmless error.74 Even if the court finds that the magistrate judge im-
properly issued the warrant, the evidence need not be excluded where
law enforcement has acted in good faith.75 Finally, it must be
remembered that warrant decisions affect the rights of individuals
(like our good Mr. Nesbitt) who have not been charged with a crime
and thus will never have occasion to file a motion to suppress. A single
warrant decision can affect the rights of many besides the accused.
These considerations refute the idea that the warrant decision
made by a magistrate judge ex ante is the same as the evidentiary rul-
ing made by a trial court ex post, separated only by time’s arrow. In
many respects the two decisions are independent of one another,
based on differing legal standards and sets of relevant facts. It is mis-
leading to suggest that they are merely two sides of the same legal
coin.
In any event, magistrate judges do not have the luxury of retro-
spective adjudication, of waiting until a suppression motion to evalu-
ate the legality of a search that has already been conducted.
Magistrate judges swear an oath to uphold the Constitution—the
same oath taken by Article III judges. When a federal agent walks into
our chambers to request an electronic surveillance order, there is no-
body there but us to make sure the Constitution is followed. If we sign
a warrant that, in our considered opinion, violates the Fourth Amend-
ment, then we have violated our solemn oath, and when we conclude
that certain types of surveillance orders must be denied because they
do not comply with the Constitution, then we owe it to the public and
law enforcement to explain our reasons on the record. That way, our
conclusions can be challenged and tested not only in the courts of
appeals but also in the court of public opinion (including, for what
it’s worth, blogs and academic journals).
In short, magistrate judges should stand up. And we must stand
up even though—or rather precisely because—Congress and the Su-
preme Court have not. We owe that much to the good Mr. Nesbitt.
73. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
74. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
75. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
